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1. Introduction





trends	 in	 research.	A	section	 follows	which	 is	devoted	 to	 the	description	of	
the	economic	 features	of	 the	ERP	 (European	Recovery	Plan)	 in	 Italy	 in	 the	






and	 the	 economic	 policies	 has	 undergone	 a	 substantial	 shift	 during	 the	 last	
fifteen	years,	which	mainly	 consists	 in	 the	 increasing	 success	 of	 a	 line	 that	
breaks	with	the	traditional	manichean	contrast	between	the	idea	of	intervention	
of	 the	 State	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 Liberalism.	 The	 fundamental	 contribution	 in	
this	 direction	 comes	 from	 the	 studies	 of	 the	 economist	Fabrizio	Barca	who	
analyses	the	shaping	process	of	Italian	capitalism	in	the	period	1945-1962/63	
from	 the	 perspective	 of	 institutional	 assets,	 public	Administration’s	modus 
operandi,	 and	 the	 job,	 products	 and	 capitals	markets.	 In	Barca’s	 analysis	 a	
central	 role	 is	played	by	 the	concept	of	«extraordinary» compromise	which	
qualifies	 the	 developing	 model	 of	 capitalism	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	









responsibility	of	 strategic	 address	 in	 economic	 choices.	 It	 is	 important	 here	
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of	1949	and	during	1950	what	he	calls	 a	«correction	of	 conduct»	 in	 Italian	












was	devoted	 to	bailing	out	 the	 Italian	 currency	 from	a	hyperbolic	 inflation.	
At	that	 time	Einaudi	was	governor	of	the	Bank	of	Italy.	Petri	faces	then	the	
question	 of	 the	 possible	 causes	 of	 the	 Communists’	 behaviour	 during	 the	
period	they	were	in	the	government.	They	did	not	support	a	technocratic	line	
of	the	economic	planning	at	all	and	this	has	to	be	explained	considering	the	
actual	Communists’	priorities.	Under	 these	circumstances,	 the	 launch	of	 the	
Marshall	plan	played	a	key-role	in	the	emersion	of	State-planning	lines	in	the	
whole	 context	of	 the	decision	making	process	 regarding	economic	policies.	
These	lines	are	represented	by	the	IRI’s	Study	Institute	led	by	the	economist	
Pasquale	Saraceno	 (IRI,	 Istituto	 per	 la	Ricostruzione	 Industriale).	A	 second	














key	political	 elections	on	18th	April	 1948	with	 a	vital	 survival	margin	 in	 a	
socially	torn	country,	also	subject	to	a	criticized	deflationary	measure.	During	
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1949	 a	 partial	 change	 in	 Italian	 economic	 policies	 takes	 place	 but	 it	 is	 not	
to	 be	 intended	 in	 a	Keynesian	 direction	 as	 desired	 by	 the	 ECA	 (Economic	
Cooperation	 Administration)	 mission.	 In	 fact,	 these	 measures	 were	 meant	
to	 provide	 capitals	 to	 industries	 in	 order	 for	 them	 to	 foster	 a	 new	 cycle	 of	
industrialization.	 According	 to	 Romero	 Marshall	 plan	 success	 in	 Italy	 is	









from	 February	 1947,	 after	 the	 communist	 exclusion	 from	 the	 government,	
Italian	 policy-makers	 launch	 a	 strong	 deflationary	 line	 and	 a	 tightening	 of	
credit	in	order	to	«save	the	lira»,	by	these	means	reassuring	the	middle	class	
and	speculators	 that	capitals	could	be	“repatriated”	with	the	consequence	of	










underneath	 supervision	 by	 the	Allied	Control	Commission	 (ACC)	 (Romero	
1994:	236-237).
Nevertheless,	 this	 strategy of indirect control	 had	 really	 negative	
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General	Badoglio’s	governments	(July	‘43	–	June	‘44)	conflict	with	antifascist	







In	 the	 two-year	 period,	 1943-45,	 inflation	 developed	mainly	 because	 of	
financing	methods	practiced	in	 the	 two	occupied	areas	of	 the	country.	From	
31	August	 1943	 until	 30	April	 1945,	 total	 net	money	 circulation	 increased	
from	115.7	 to	360.7	billion	 liras	with	an	 increase	of	65%	deriving	from	the	
Northern	 area	 of	German	 occupation	 and	 of	 31%	 provoked	 by	 the	 already	
mentioned	 allied	military	 notes	 («amliras»)	 issued	 to	 some	 degree	 without	








Parri‘s	 government	 (June	 –	 November	 ‘45)	 nor	 first	 christian-democrat	
government	 led	by	Alcide	De	Gasperi	 (December	 ‘45	–	 July	 ‘46)	 took	 that	
measure.	Furthermore,	widespread	opposition	to	this	option	into	the	Bank	of	
Italy	made	it	fade	once	and	for	all	(Petri	1997:	325-326).




policy,	 known	 as	 democratic recovery policy	 contributed,	 however,	 to	 the	
opening	of	a	dialogue	between	AMG	and	the	newborn	and	sole	 trade	union	
(CGIL,	Confederazione	Generale	Italiana	del	Lavoro),	dialogue	that	enabled,	
in	Northern	 Italy,	 to	 refer	 to	an	authoritative	and	 representative	 interlocutor	
with	 which	 to	 defuse	 pressures	 towards	 social	 unrest	 and	 disintegration.	
Furthermore,	 allied	 authorities’	desire	 for	dialogue	contributed	 to	 resistance	
disarmament	and	to	transference	of	power	to	the	Government	in	Rome	without	
resorting	to	force	(Romero	1994:	239-240).
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United	 States	 policy	 makers	 found	 it	 difficult	 to	 work	 out	 a	 clear	 line	 of	
conduct	to	face	reconstruction	difficulties	after	the	end	of	conflict	and	AMG	
demobilisation.	Italy	was	emerging	from	the	war	with	its	economic	fabric	in	
a	 tricky	 situation.	 Industry	 did	 not	 undergo	 severe	 damages	 during	 conflict	
which	 was	 fought	 mainly	 in	 the	 South	 where	 the	 core-base	 of	 industrial	
assets	was	not	located.	It	was	concentrated	instead	in	the	so-called	“industrial	
triangle”	 Milano-Torino-Genova	 with	 branches	 in	 Emilia	 Romagna	 and	
Veneto.	In	particular,	mechanical	engineering	and	electric	industry,	following	
the	 increase	 in	productivity	during	 the	war,	were	able	 to	start	activity	again	













The	 fear	 of	 a	 possible	 communist	 advancement	 in	 the	 country	 provoked	
by	economic	and	social	sufferings,	led	admiral	Ellery	Stone,	leader	of	ACC,	
to	 ask	Washington	 for	 a	 huge	 shipment	 of	 economic	 aids	 supported	 by	 the	
Italian	embassy	in	the	US.	On	10	July	1945,	undersecretary	to	Foreign	Affairs	
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for	 Italy.	 It	was	managed	by	 a	United	Nation	mission	 that	 placed	 at	 Italy’s	
disposal	about	$	450	million	consisting	of	 foods,	 fuel	and	medicines	whose	
sale	on	the	Italian	market	brought	to	the	formation	of	the	«lira	fund»	that	had	






Italian	 historiographical	 debate	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	 UNRRA	 aid	
under	the	point	of	view	of	primary	consumption	and	the	balance	of	payment.	





thus	 thwarting	any	potential	Keynesian	 influence	of	UN	aid	 (Romero	1994:	
243).
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In	fact,	the	true	reason	behind	Italy’s	direct	demand	to	Robert	Lovett,	Marshall’s	
deputy,	was	not	 food	worries	but	 the	desire	 to	restore	 industrial	growth	and	
more	 generally	 to	 support	 the	 economy	 as	 a	 whole.	 This	 is	 quite	 clear	 in	




beyond	 October	 1947,	 imports	 that	 were	 requested	 by	 industrial	 demand.	
Therefore	Interim	Aid’s	principal	goal	was	to	widen	operating	margins	for	the	





“Stabilization	 was	 made	 possible	 by	 Interim	 aid.	 Communists	 and	 political	 parties	
linked	to	them	were	strong.	Interim	aid	and	Marshall	plan	perspective	made	it	possible	
to	 reach	price	stability	and,	consequently,	 trust	 in	currency.	These	conditions	helped	







entangled.	 It	 is	 important	here	 to	show	in	advance	a	meaningful	conclusion	
shared	by	most	of	leading	Italian	scholars	i.e.	in	the	whole	process	of	economic	
policy	 definition	 during	 reconstruction	 Italian	 policy	 makers	 enjoyed	 wide	
margins	of	freedom	and	independence	from	external	pressures	and	specifically	
American	ones	(Sapelli	1997:	2).	
In	more	 general	 terms,	 the	 reconstruction	 process	was	 part	 of	 the	wider	
shaping	 scheme	of	 Italian	 capitalism	after	Second	World	War.	This	 process	
took	 the	 shape	 of	 an	 «extraordinary compromise»:	 compromise	 because	
it	was	 the	 result	 of	mediation	 among	very	 different	 ideas	 and	 interests	 that	
could	find	a	point	of	agreement	in	one	renounce	and	one	choice.	The	former	
consisted	in	not	creating	the	«rules	of	the	game»	for	the	ordinary	functioning	
of	 job,	 capitals	 and	goods	markets	 as	well	 as	 of	 the	Public	Administration.	
The	choice,	in	continuity	with	Fascist	period,	consisted	in	the	decision	to	face	
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policies	 to	 support	 Italy	was	 clear	 since	 summer	 ‘46.	The	 rationale	 of	 this	
reappraisal	lies	both	in	the	growing	strains	inside	Italian	economy	and	in	the	
social	and	political	crisis	 that	 led	 to	 the	clash	between	 the	communist	party	
and	minister	of	Treasury	Corbino	who	submitted	his	resignation.	Under	those	
circumstances,	the	US	embassy	in	Rome	as	well	as	the	UNRRA	staff	agreed	
that	principal	 tasks	were	now	the	rescue	of	 the	 lira	and	 the	open	clash	with	
PCI.	However,	 times	and	 forms	of	 reconstruction	were	not	compatible	with	
contradictory	and	ineffective	policy	of	Italian	government	composed	both	by	
the	Left	and	the	liberals	(Romero	1994:	244).
The	 Italian	 prime	 minister’s	 visit	 to	 Washington	 (5-14	 January	 1947)	
assumed	 a	 strong	 political	 meaning	 but	 brought	 scarce	 economic	 results	
showing,	 however,	 a	 convergence	 between	 De	 Gasperi’s	 and	 Washington	
political	 interests.	The	difference	 regarded	once	 again	 times	 and	modes	not	
yet	 corresponding	because	of	 a	gap	 in	 the	 evolution	of	 Italian	 crisis	 and	of	
European	context	that	is	to	say	the	US	foreign	policy	horizon.	The	progressive	
approach	 between	 those	 two	 contexts	 was	 however	 nearer	 and	 nearer:	 on	
February	1947	the	Italian	government	signed	a	peace	treaty	and	the	following	
month	 signed	 Lateran	 treaty	 with	 the	 Vatican.	 Those	 two	 important	 goals	
1	 	 The	 interests	 involved	 in	 this	 «extraordinary	 compromise»	 are,	 according	 to	 Barca,	 the	
following:	 «nittian»	 option,	 radical	 liberalism,	 communist	 strategy,	 «social-christian»	 thought,	
diversified	industrial	interests,	Washington	option.
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immediately	proposed	 an	unrealistic	 comparison	between	 Italian	 and	Greek	
crisis	and	asked	 for	an	 immediate	huge	 loan	 to	US	ambassador	 in	Rome	 to	
stabilize	 the	country.	 In	spite	of	 this	call	 for	help,	ambassador	James	Dunn,	
while	 repeating	 American	 support	 and	 trust	 in	 De	 Gasperi,	 made	 it	 clear	
that	 a	 substantial	 involvement	would	 come	 only	 after	 a	 clear	 sign	 towards	
political	and	economic	stabilization.	The	expected	sign	in	Washington	came	
on	13	May	1947	with	 the	government	 crisis	 opened	by	De	Gasperi.	On	16	
and	 20	 May,	 Italian	 ambassador	 Tarchiani	 met	 several	 times	 in	 the	 State	
Department	 Marshall	 himself	 in	 order	 to	 support	 De	 Gasperi’s	 initiative	
receiving	assurances	from	Marshall	on	the	complete	support	to	De	Gasperi’s	
anti-communist	effort.	On	the	following	31	May,	De	Gasperi	launched	the	first	












called	 «Einaudi	 line»	 (from	 the	 name	 of	 the	 then	 governor	 of	 the	Bank	 of	
Italy):	 it	consisted	in	a	monetary	squeeze	that	was	judged	necessary	also	by	
American	authorities	in	order	to	stabilize	currency	while	waiting	for	ERP	aid.	
Scholars’	 interpretation	 about	 Einaudi’s	 line	 is	 not	 unanimous.	 In	 the	 next	
section	we	will	make	a	comparison	between	the	most	recent	positions	taken	
by	historians.	
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3. The «Einaudi line»: features and interpretations









that	 aimed	 to	 restore	 trust	 in	 currency	and	 to	curb	 inflation,	 is	 synonymous	
with	capitalist	stabilization	in	traditional	historical	criticism.	Recently	a	new	








The	 Economics	 historian	 Rolf	 Petri	 argues	 that	 the	 first	 two	 De	 Gasperi’s	
governments	were	characterized	by	an	economic	package	regarding	foreign-
exchange	market	and	domestic	market	of	a	clearly	liberalistic	direction.	The	
launch	 of	 „Reconstruction	 loan“	 on	October	 1946	 explained	with	 the	 need	
of	 improving	 the	 financial	 backing	 of	 huge	 public	 spending,	 resulted	 in	 an	
excessive	increase	of	money	disposable	for	credit	institutions	thus	worsening	
speculation	and	stockpiling	 rather	 than	productive	 investments	 (Petri	1997).	
The	principal	changes	obtained	by	the	«Einaudi	line»	are	three:	the	opening	
of	 a	 phase	marked	by	 economic	 stability	 preserved	by	monetary	orthodoxy	
guarantors	 (i.e.	 Bank	 of	 Italy);	 the	 strengthening	 of	 state-intervention	
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through	 the	ministry	 of	Treasury	while	 the	Bank	 of	 Italy	was	 in	 charge	 of	
monetary	stability	through	the	newborn	CICR	(Spagnolo	2001:	88).
The	second	phase	of	the	measure	(22	August	–	late	September	‘47)	began	
















(and	 overvalued)	 and	 then	 useless	 outside	 that	 very	 bilateral	 agreement.	
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In	 similar	 vein,	 Giulio	 Sapelli’s	 interpretation	 is	 clear:	 Einaudi’s	
designation	to	minister	of	Budget,	“a	ministerial	post	created	ad hoc	to	enable	
middle	class	and	speculators’	supporters	 leader	 to	 take	 the	 leadership	of	 the	
country’s	economic	policy	[..]”	(Sapelli	1997:	28),	was	the	sign	of	antifascist	










The	 clear	 christian-democrats	 election	 success	 on	 18	 April	 1948	 was	
influenced	 also	 by	 a	 massive	 propaganda	 campaign	 organized	 by	 the	 US	
with	anti-communist	 function	and	characterized	by	placing	 in	 the	middle	of	
the	 political	 struggle	 the	 imminent	 arrival	 of	Marshall	 plan	 aid.	During	 the	
last	weeks	of	the	election	campaign,	State	secretary	George	Marshall	made	it	
publicly	clear	that	ERP	aid	for	Italy	would	have	been	cancelled	if	the	Italian	
communist	 party	 (PCI,	 Partito	 Comunista	 Italiano)	 had	 won	 the	 election.	
Election	success	for	De	Gasperi,	on	one	side	represented	one	of	the	first	major	
achievements	of	US strategy of containment,	 on	 the	other	 it	 reassessed	DC	
dependence	from	United	States	 in	concurrence	with	weak	result	 for	 liberals	
and	social	democrats.	Substantial	differences	between	Rome	and	Washington	
policies	to	reach	economic	stabilization	would	emerge	soon	behind	common	
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4. European Recovery Program (ERP) in Italy 
Recently,	 a	 periodization	 of	 ERP	 aid	 in	 Italy	 has	 been	 proposed	 consisting	
of	two	phases	which	followed	one	another	between	the	second	half	of	1949	
and	1950.	The	principal	difference	between	them	is	related	to	impact	of	aids	
on	 the	 economy	and	 to	ECA	pressures	 on	 Italian	government:	 a	first	 phase	
marked	 by	 substantial	 ineffectiveness	 is	 followed	 by	 a	 phase	 characterized	
by	 strong	 quantitative	 influence	 on	 public	 budget	 and	 by	 American	 staff	
pressures	 towards	 a	 Keynesian	 use	 of	 available	 funds.	 This	 chronological	
model	of	describing	ERP	is	confirmed	by	the	comparison	between	the	change	

























‘48,	during	a	conference	organized	by	 the	Confederation	of	 Italian	 Industry	
(Confindustria)	 titled	 “Italian	 industrial	 economy	and	European	cooperation	
programs	with	particular	regard	to	European	Recovery	Program”.	According	
to	 Pella,	 the	Marshall	 plan	 counterpart	 fund	 could	 feed	 public	 expenditure	
Italian Economic Reconstruction and the Marshall Plan. A Reassessment
PIFO Occasional Papers No. 3/2009 | Seite 18
without	 inflation	 as	 long	 as	 it	was	 addressed	 towards	growth	of	 production	
and	productivity	(Spagnolo	2001:	174-175).	In	this	context,	counterpart	fund	






opinion	as	a	project	of	diffusion	of	a	newer	and	more	prosperous	way of life 
(Ellwood	1985).3
In	spite	of	this	success,	American	trade	unionists	failed	in	transmitting	their	
model	of	 settlement	of	 the	 social	 conflict	 to	 Italy.4	To	be	more	precise,	 this	
failure	was	double:	on	one	side,	Italian	choices	in	the	conduction	of	economy	
were	 different,	 as	 already	 stressed,	 from	 those	 desired	 by	 trade	 unionists	
supporting	the	New	Deal.	Italian	choices	remained	indeed	linked	and	rooted	
on	internal	national	dynamics.	On	the	other	side,	the	contractualistic	and	non-
political	model	 of	 industrial	 relations	 promoted	 by	 the	 ERP	 in	 Europe	 and	
in	which	 trade	unions	would	have	played	a	 leading	role	 in	 the	negotiations,	
never	took	place.	On	the	contrary,	Italian	unions	faced	a	long	period	of	decline	
distant	from	that	role	of	major	supporter	of	the	development	in	the	framework	
of	 neo-corporatism	 desired	 by	 new	 dealers	 unionists	 in	 the	 ECA	 (Romero	
1988:	367-369).	
The	need	for	a	boost	in	economy	was	moving	forward	little	by	little	inside	
government	 alliance	 and	 entrepreneurs	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 (December	
1948)	ECA	threatened	to	cut	aids	for	Italy	in	1948-49	from	$	601	million	to	
$	 583	million	 because	 of	 high	 increase	 in	 Italian	monetary	 reserves	 during	
2	 	According	 to	 Chiarella	 Esposito,	 Pella	 could	 follow	 undisturbed	 his	 policies	 of	 monetary	
stabilization	principally	 thanks	 to	 the	 internal	divisions	and	 the	chaotic	situation	 in	 the	various	
levels	of	ECA.	This	condition	was	provoked	by	 the	ECA	staff’s	 incapability	 to	understand	 the	
Italian	reality	in	which	it	was	necessary	to	gain	political	alliances	rather	than	to	rely	on	technical	
and	administrative	solutions	to	achieve	economic	development.	(Esposito	1994)




4	 	 American	 trade	 unions	 participation	 to	 international	 political	 initiatives	 promoted	 by	 US	
administrations	in	 the	post-war	period	can	be	explained	considering	the	global	character	of	 the	
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the	 last	 three	months	 of	 1948.	 The	 conflict	 between	 different	 development	
strategies	 for	 Italy	 conceived	 by	 centrist	 government	 and	 by	 ECA	 came	 to	
light	on	February	1949	with	the	presentation	to	American	Congress	of	the	ERP	
first-year	 report	 presented	 by	ECA	 president	 Paul	Hoffman.	The	 “Hoffman	
report”	contained	some	enclosed	studies	regarding	each	country	involved	in	
the	 plan,	 the	 so	 called Country studies.	Country	 study	on	 Italy	 expressed	 a	
severe	criticism	with	regard	to	national	development	programs	with	references	
to	long-term	plan,	the	afore-mentioned	“Saraceno	plan”:	excessive	monetary	







The	 dispute	 emerged	 with	 Country	 study	 between	 Italy	 and	 the	 United	
States	was	one	of	the	concurrent	factors	which	contributed	towards	a	change	
in	Italian	investment	policy.	The	most	recent	studies	have	defined	it	as	1949	
«small turning point».	The	next	section	 is	dedicated	 to	describe	 this	 further	
step	in	post	war	economic	reconstruction.	
5. The «small turning point», «third stage» and perspectives5











In	order	 to	shed	 light	on	 this	point	 it	 is	useful	 to	 refer	 to	 that	 interpretation	
which	describes	 this	 change	as	a	«correction	of	conduct».	At	 the	beginning	
5	 	 In	 Italian	 historical	 literature	 «piccola	 svolta»	 and	 «terzo	 tempo»	 are	 the	 expressions	 here	
translated	with	«small	turning	point»	and	«third	stage».
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of	Autonomous Public Boards. Southern Italy Development Fund	(Cassa	per	
il	Mezzogiorno,	Casmez)	was	created	 to	enable	 the	State	 to	 start	 a	 ten-year	









notables.	The	 tasks	 that	ECA	expected	 the	 Italian	 government	 to	 undertake	
within	the	framework	of	the	so	called	Productivity Drive	were	only	fulfilled	
on	 a	 microeconomic	 level	 by	 acquiring	 new	 plants	 and	 machinery	 and	 by	
introducing	new	organizational	models.	The	sectors	 that	benefited	 from	this	
rationalization	 process	 through	 technological	 transfer	 were	 the	 mechanical	







(otherwise	 unavailable	 in	 Italy)	 and	 the	 consolidation	 of	 direct	 connection	
between	Ercole	Marelli	and	Westinghouse	(D’Attorre	1985a:	74-76).
The	 iron	 and	 steel	 industry	 benefited	 from	ERP	 aid	 in	 a	 crucial	way.	 In	
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DC	government	 in	case	 the	Cornigliano	plant	would	not	 start	operating.	So	
most	of	the	supplies	was	delivered	within	the	end	of	1952.	The	other	perspective	






The	 so-called	 depressed	 areas	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 Mezzogiorno	 were	
important	 recipients	 of	 ERP	 aid	 as	 mentioned	 before	 with	 regard	 to	 the	
institution	of	 the	Cassa	per	 il	Mezzogiorno.	The	case	of	Sicily	shows	some	
central	 themes	 and	 behaviours	 adopted	 by	 ECA	 administration	 and	 by	 the	
Italian	government	at	both	central	 and	 local	 level.	The	 role	and	 importance	
of	the	announced	American	aid	to	Europe	were	mainly	interpreted	in	political	
rather	than	economic	perspective	in	Italy	until	the	key	election	of	April	1948.	
Sicily,	 although	with	 some	 disruptive	 elements	 of	 the	 social	 fabric	 such	 as	
mafia	and	brigandage,	was	animated	by	innovative	cultural	initiatives	aimed	
at	the	economic	and	civil	reprise	of	the	island	and	those	found	further	strength	
from	 the	 very	 announcement	 of	 a	 long-term	 plan	 of	 economic	 aid.	 During	
the	 two-year	 period	 1947-48,	 among	 the	 different	 positions	 and	 proposals	
regarding	 industrialization	 and	 reactivation	 of	 the	 pre-war	 manufacturing	
assets,	the	pragmatic	line	upheld	by	members	of	local	and	central	government	
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(preceding	 the	 two	 aforementioned	measures)	 strongly	 reduced	 their	 range.	
The	Einaudian	measures	penalized	much	more	the	South	than	the	North	of	the	
country	in	view	of	the	production	recovery	even	though	small	criticism	came	
from	 the	most	 influential	 economic	circles	 and	 from	 the	press	of	 the	 island	
because	these	measures	defended	savings	and	fixed	estate	incomes	(D’Attorre	
1986:	6-8).
The	 distinctiveness	 of	 the	 Sicilian	 case	 lay	 in	 the	 massive	 action	 of	
propaganda	 and	 pressure	 on	 the	 Department	 of	 state	 exerted	 by	 the	 Italo-
American	Committee	that	was	born	on	1941	thanks	to	the	initiative	of	some	AFL	
(American	Federation	of	Labour)	members.	On	March	1948,	the	Committee	
sent	a	 report	 to	Washington	 in	which	 it	was	stressed	 the	central	position,	 in	
the	context	of	 the	“problema	Italia”,	of	 the	“questione	meridionale”	 in	anti-
communist	function.	In	this	vein	an	immediate	agrarian	reform	was	supported	









problem	of	 industrialization	 (with	 the	exception	of	 the	mining	 industry	 that	
attracted	American	interest	in	the	ERP	context),	overestimated	the	effectiveness	
of	„technical“	answers	 to	consolidated	economic	and	social	bottlenecks	and	
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for	 industry,	while	 the	 loans	assigned	 to	Sicilian	 industries	amounted	 to	 the	
3.5%	of	the	available	allocation	with	a	clear	prevalence	for	electric	industries.	
Sicily	 received,	 for	what	 regards	 the	 lira	 fund,	 26.6	 billion	 liras,	 about	 4%	
of	 the	whole	counterpart	 fund,	an	amount	since	 then	 judged	 too	small	 for	a	




tasks	 set	 in	 advance	 were	 only	 marginally	 fulfilled,	 as	 the	 parliamentary	
inquiries	on	poverty,	unemployment	and	workers’	 living	standards	revealed.	
Nevertheless,	 a	 concrete	 achievement	 in	 anti-communist	 stance	 was	 found	
by	 social	 stabilization	 through	 charging	 entrenched	 local	 institutions	 of	 the	
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alignment)	 that	American	aids	were	not	necessary	 for	 Italy;	on	 the	contrary	





redistribution.	 The	 Marshall	 plan,	 while	 introducing	 a	 bias	 in	 market	 and	
balances	of	payment	of	involved	countries,	enabled	to	avoid	cut	in	consumption	















American	 aids	 allowed	 involved	 countries	 to	 avoid	 cuts	 in	 consumption	
and	to	negotiate	the	process	of	reconstruction	and	Italian	government,	though	
developing	 orthodox	 and	 non-expansive	monetary	 policies,	 could	 stockpile	
precious	reserves	for	imports	above	all	during	1951-53	(Spagnolo	2001:	138).	
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Marshall	 plan	 anti-communist	 meaning	 in	 Italy	 was	 not	 unfolded	 through	
ECA	mission	 supported	 social	 philosophy	 devoted	 to	 combine	 growth	 and	
consumption,	productivity	and	working	class	integration	in	economic	welfare.	
It	 was	 rather	 unfolded	 through	 political	 and	 economic	 strengthening	 of	
anticommunist	social	alliance	under	Christian-democratic	leadership.	The	use	
of	«extraordinary»	means	of Autonomous Public Boards	aimed	to	allocate	ERP	
resources	either	towards	public	and	private	industrial	entities	enjoying	highest	
negotiating	power	(Fiat,	Finsider,	Edison)	or	 towards	underdeveloped	areas,	
first	 of	 all	 the	 South	 of	 Italy,	 the	 so	 called	Mezzogiorno,	 through	Southern 
Italy Development Fund	(Cassa	per	il	Mezzogiorno,	Casmez)	(Romero	1994:	
264-265).
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